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Participate at Your Peril:
The Need for Resolution of the Conflict
Surrounding Employee Participation Programs
by the TEAM Act of 1997
I. INTRODUCTION
The following scenario is not uncommon: a single parent who works
the night shift in the manufacturing facility of a major American corpo-
ration is having difficulty because he cannot provide evening supervi-
sion for his teenage child. A strict seniority system controls shift assign-
ments for the facility and any change in shift assignments would have
an adverse impact on his co-workers. Management learns of the prob-
lem and forms a committee comprised of his co-workers and a manage-
ment representative to address how to adjust work assignments to
create more flexibility for this parent. While this activity seems reason-
able, management at this company and management using similar tech-
niques throughout the country are at risk of committing unfair labor
practices under current labor laws.'
Recognizing that a significant advantage lies in a highly skilled and
motivated workforce, many employers have implemented employee
participation programs2 which foster communication between employ-
1. See Selected Testimony Before Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee
Hearing on TEAM Act (S. 295), February 12, 1997, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30,
at E-2 to E-3 (Feb. 13, 1997)) [hereinafter Selected Testimony] (testimony of J.
Thomas Bouchard, Senior Vice President, Human Resources, IBM, describing a similar
scenario at an IBM manufacturing facility upon which this hypothetical scenario is
based).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 9 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823. There is
no single dominant form of employee participation program. The most common forms
of programs are: (1) joint labor-management committees, which discuss a wide range
of workplace issues; (2) quality circles, which focus on the production process and
ways to improve efficiency, as well as the quality of the final product; and (3) quali-
ty of work-life groups, which focus less on the actual production process and more
on the work environment and ways to improve it. Id.; see John R. McLain, Partic-
ipatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 83 MICH. L REv. 1736, 1738-41 (1985). For detailed examples of employee
participation programs in both unionized and nonunionized settings, see Thomas C.
ers and employees on issues crucial to developing and maintaining
competitive advantages.3 The use of these programs highlights the im-
portance of employee insight on issues relating to productivity, efficien-
cy, and quality as well as improvement of employee morale through
increased involvement in management decisions.4
Despite the apparent benefits that accompany programs designed to
enhance the relationship between employers and employees, these pro-
grams are nonetheless threatened by sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA), which make it illegal for an em-
ployer to dominate a labor organization.6 Under the broad interpreta-
tion of the term "labor organization," employee conunittees may consti-
tute statutory labor organizations.7 To the extent that an employer par-
Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain SignIficance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 510-14 (1986).
3. Steven L Schlossberg & Steven M. Fetter, U.S. Labor Law and the Future of
Labor-Management Cooperation, 3 LAB. LAw. 11, 17 (1987). Today's global economy
mandates that employers capitalize on any tools available to them to improve produc-
tivity, quality, and efficiency. See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78
CORNELL L REv. 899, 901 (1993). As of 1982, at least one third of the Fortune 500
companies had implemented some form of employee participation program, ranging
from one-way communication in the form of suggestion boxes to substantial bilateral
communication and worker involvement in management. Schlossberg & Fetter, supra,
at 14. Today, more than 8096 of the largest employers in the United States, com-
prising an estimated 30,000 workplaces, have implemented employee involvement
programs. H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997).
4. See Kohler, supra note 2, at 504. Supporters of employee participation pro-
grams cite efficiency, strengthened commitment, and increased productivity among
employees as the prominent benefits of the programs. See Chris Doucouliagos, Worker
Participation and Productivity in Labor-Managed and Participatory Capitalist
Firms: A Meta-Analysis, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 58, 58 (1995). Opponents argue
that these programs reduce managerial power and burden the decision-making pro-
cess. Id. An overwhelming number of employees support programs that give them a
greater voice and facilitate management cooperation. H.R. REP. NO. 104-248, at 5
(1995), available in 1995 WL 560823. Seventy-six percent of workers surveyed in 1994
believed that their involvement in decisions relating to production and operations
would improve the competitiveness of their companies, and 7996 reported having "per-
sonally benefitted" from the process. Id. (citing Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogem,
Worker Representation and Participation Survey, Conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates, December 1994).
5. National Labor Relations Act, as amended, §§ 2(5), 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5),
158(a)(2) (1994). Section 2(5) defines "labor organization" and section 8(a)(2) makes
it unlawful for an employer to dominate or interfere with a statutory labor organiza-
tion. Id. § 158(a)(2); see infra text accompanying note 42 for the text of § 2(5) and
text accompanying note 69 for the full text of § 8(a)(2).
6. Id. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2). See generally PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEvELOPING LABOR
LAw, ch. 8 (3d ed. 1992) (providing an overview of the employer domination and
assistance issue).
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959) (establishing a broad
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ticipates in the formation and operation of these organizations, they are
vulnerable to attack as illegal employer-dominated organizations.'
These broad statutory definitions create conflict for employers who
desire to implement cooperative and participatory programs in the
workplace.'
The Electromation, Inc.'° decision of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB or Board) in 1992 bolstered the current conflict surround-
ing employee participation programs in the nonunion workplace." This
decision created a chilling effect on employee participation programs, 2
offering only minimal guidance as to when such programs will be le-
gal.'" One proposed solution to alleviate the confusion surrounding
these programs is a legislative amendment to the National Labor Rela-
definition of "labor organization" by holding that the language "dealing with" in sec-
tion 2(5) encompassed more than bargaining with the employer); infra notes 46-48
and accompanying text (discussing the Cabot Carbon decision).
8. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). The attack on such organizations generally comes in
the form of unfair labor practice charges filed by a union that desires to represent
employees. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 295.
9. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 295. "The very breadth of the definition of [labor
organization] has called into question a variety of 'participatory management' ar-
rangements, bringing the section 8(a)(2) prohibition into conflict with emerging man-
agerial techniques for enhancing employee involvement." Id, The adversary nature of
the workplace in the 1930s warranted these broad statutory definitions, but they "no
longer make sense. in today's [cooperative] workplace." H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 6
(1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
10. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.LRB. 990 (1992), enforced 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994). In Electromation, the Board held that five employee "action committees" com-
prised of volunteer employees and members of management were labor organizations
because they discussed matters involving employee dissatisfaction and that the em-
ployer unlawfully dominated these labor organizations because the employer created
them and determined their structure and function. Electromation, 309 N.LR.B. at 997;
see infra notes 84-100 (discussing the Electromation decision).
11. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 13, 15 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823; 141
CONG. REc. H9523 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995).
12. See generally Elizabeth Walpole-Hofmeister, Employee Participation" Need for
Labor Law Change Debated Before Senate Panel, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at D-
14 (Feb. 9, 1996) (noting the dampened enthusiasm of employers for creating employ-
ee participation groups despite the relatively small number of domination cases be-
fore the NLRB).
13. Electromation contained four opinions, leaving employers to rely on nonspecific
pieces of dicta in making decisions regarding employee involvement programs. See
HR. REP. No. 104-248, at 13 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823; see also infra
notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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tions Act.'4 The Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997's
(TEAM Act) proposes to amend section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA to provide
that an employer's establishing, assisting, maintaining, or participating
in any organization in which employees participate on matters regarding
quality, productivity, and efficiency will not be an unfair labor prac-
tice." While proponents of the legislation feel that this is an important
step toward improving the ability of American companies to compete in
the global marketplace, 7 opponents feel that this amendment would
invite, a return to the evils of company unions" which minimize
employees' rights by giving them a false sense of protection."
14. See Michael H. Cimini & Charles J. Muhl, Dunlop Commission Reports, MONTH-
LY LAB. REv., Apr. 1995, at 75. In its report, the Clinton-appointed Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations proposed that section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
be amended to permit employee participation programs to discuss terms and condi-
tions of employment when they arise tangentially in relation to discussions concern-
ing productivity and efficiency. Id.; see also Remarks of John S. Irving to Chicago
Meeting of Association of Labor Relations Agencies, July 25, 1995, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 142, at D-21 (July 25, 1995). For an analysis of proposed judicial resolu-
tions, see Audrey Anne Smith, Comment, The uture of Labor-Management Coopera-
tion Following Electromation and E.I. du Pont, 35 SANTA CLARA L REv. 225, 257-63
(1995).
15. H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997). Identical legislation,
known as the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, passed both hous-
es of Congress in 1996 but was vetoed by President Clinton. 142 CONG. REC. H8816
(daily ed. July 30, 1996). Many of the arguments made during the 1995 Act's debates
will be made again as the 1997 Act moves through the legislative process. The sub-
stance of the 1995 Act arguments will be used throughout this Comment to examine
the anticipated arguments for and against the renewed legislation.
16. H.R. 634; S. 295. This legislation would make it less burdensome for employers
to establish joint labor-management committees and employee participation programs
for legitimate purposes by eliminating the fear of unfair labor practice charges. See
id.; in.fra Part W.
17. See 141 CONG. REc. E228 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1995) (statement of Rep. Harris W.
Fawell). In his remarks supporting the TEAM Act, Representative Fawell discussed
the ability of foreign competitors to gain competitive advantages because of their
extensive use of labor-management cooperation techniques and noted the competitive
disadvantage of U.S. companies due to legal impediments to implementing such tech-
niques. Id. Representative Fawell also characterized the statutory definition of labor
organization as "a 60-year-old definition of labor organization [which is] colliding
head-on with dynamic new concepts of doing business in today's fast evolving, infor-
mation-centered economy and society." 141 CONG. REc. H9525 (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1995).
18. See William Tench, 'Worker Involvement' Means Union Busting, NAT'L LJ., Aug.
14, 1995, at A18. Opponents suggest that the Act will undermine employee protections
by allowing nonunion employees to establish sham unions and by allowing other
employees to establish company-dominated organizations while their co-employees are
seeking legitimate unionization. 141 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (re-
marks of Rep. Owens). Representative Owens argued that the TEAM Act would un-
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This Comment explores the current conflict relating to employer-
employee cooperative efforts and the need for the implementation of
the TEAM Act. Part II discusses the legislative history of the National
Labor Relations Act and examines the nature of the workplace at the
time of its enactment.19 Part 11 discusses the judicial and administra-
tive interpretions of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) that led to Electromation
and subsequent decisions.' Part IV focuses on the TEAM Act of 1997
and the conflicting views regarding its passage, including an explana-
tion as to why the TEAM Act is crucial to the success of American
companies in the global marketplace.2" Part V concludes with the rami-
fications on the American workplace should the TEAM Act be defeated
again. 2
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTIONS 2(5) AND 8(A)(2) OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The current dispute surrounding employee involvement programs
closely parallels the disputes surrounding "company unions" at the time
of the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act.' Company-dom-
inated unions, also known as "sham unions," were in-house labor orga-
nizations implemented and controlled by the employer.' These organi-
zations purported to represent the employees, but were actually an im-
pediment to legitimate unionization.2 5 Company unions posed a serious
dermine the success that collective bargaining has brought to the American
workplace. Id. Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees workers the right to seek indepen-
dent union representation. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
The union engages with the employer in the collective bargaining process to deter-
mine terms and conditions of employment, wages and general protection of the em-
ployees. Id. For a detailed overview of the NLRA and the collective bargaining pro-
cess, see generally HARDIN, supra note 6.
19. See infra Part ]I.
20. See infra Part Ill.
21. See infrr Part IV.
22. See irfra Part V.
23. See Tench, supra note 18, at A18. For a detailed history of the National Labor
Relations Act as amended, see generally HARDIN, supra note 6, at 3-66; LEROY S.
MERRIFLD ET AL, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 43-61 (8th ed. 1989).
24. 78 CONG. REC. 3,443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NLRA, 1935, at 15-16 (1949) [hereinafter 1 NLRB 1935]. These company unions arose
under the National Industrial Recovery Act, which permitted the abuses that the
NLRA later sought to prohibit. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 25-26.
25. 78 CONG. REc. 3,443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note 24, at 15-
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threat to the employees' rights to freely choose representation during a
period when they needed significant protection from their employers.26
In response to the concern regarding the prevalence of company un-
ions, which undermined the NLRA's policy to promote industrial peace
through the process of collective bargaining, Congress banned company
unions by enacting sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act"
A. Prohibition of the Company Union: Protection of Employees'
Rights Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
The specific purpose behind sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the Act was
to prohibit company unions that were formed and dominated by em-
ployers and limited employees' right to free choice guaranteed by sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA.2 At the time Congress enacted these provisions,
the company union was a prevalent problem,' and employer-employee
relations were highly adversarial.'
16.
26. Id, Although the discussion focused on the concerns regarding company un-
ions, Senator Wagner recognized that employee participation renders important bene-
fits and that the highest degree of cooperation arises when the employee can freely
choose to participate or withdraw. Id. at 24; see also CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN LABOR
& EMPLOYMENT LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIvERsITY's 46TH ANNuAL NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR § 13.6, 346 (Bruno Stein ed. 1994) (noting that the proposition
that important benefits arise from cooperative employment relationships is not a new
one).
27. See 78 CONG. REc. 3,443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note 24, at
15-16 (remarks of Sen. Wagner). For an analysis of the origin of the prohibition on
company unions, see Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company
Union" Prohibition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69
N.Y.U. L REv. 125, 129-33 (1994). The preamble to the NLRA states that the policy of
the United States is to facilitate the free flow of commerce by "protecting the exer-
cise by workers pf full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representations of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." National Labor
Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1936) (discussing the history and purpose behind the Act).
28. See 78 CONG REC. 3,443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note 24, at
15-16; HARDIN, supra note 6, at 289 (describing the purpose of section 8(a)(2)). Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA explicitly grants employees the right to free choice of bargaining
representatives. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). This right lies at the heart of the NLRA.
29. 78 CONG. REC. 4,229 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note 24, at 23-
24. In his remarks, Senator Wagner noted that a 1933 study of 25% of mining and
manufacturing workers revealed that 45.796 of the employees were bargaining individu-
ally and 4596 were enlisted in company unions, while only 9.396 of employees were
dealing through traditional trade unions. Id. at 23.
30. Id. The two assumptions underlying section 8(a)(2) were that employees prefer
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This adversarial nature of the employment relationship, which fueled
the passage of NLRA, also led to a broad statutory definition of a "labor
organization" as "any organization of any kind.., in which employees
participate and which exists for the purpose... of dealing with em-
ployers" about certain work-related issues." Section 8(a)(2) makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it." ' The evil that Congress sought to
eliminate was the limitation that employer-dominated organizations
placed on employees because they could not "cope with any issues that
transcend[ed] the boundaries of a single business."' Congress viewed
the inability of these employees to gain knowledge from outside unions
as a major impediment to industrial peace.' Although Congress sought
independent representation and that the nature of the top-down management systems
in mass production industries does not require reliance on employee input Estreicher,
supra note 27, at 133. The absence of "brain work" by employees on the job, which
was once part of the workplace culture, has long been dutmoded by the view of
employers that employee participation is vital to creating a competitive advantage. See
id. at 126-27; 141 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995). In the 1990s, the ad-
versary nature of the employment relationship has in many respects evolved into one
of participation, and the dangers of limiting employee participation have become the
focal point of the current controversy. See 141 CONG. REC. E228 (daily ed. Jan. 31,
1995) (remarks of Rep. Fawell).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). For the full text of section 2(5), see infura text accompany-
ing note 42. In defining "labor organization," Congress sought to include any form of
organization that could act as a bargaining representative for employees. See S. REP.
No. 74-573, at 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATWE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 2306 (1948) [hereinafter 2 NLRB 1947). Con-
gress included the explicit reference to employee representation committees, which
were a common form of company union, in the final version of the Act to ensure
that section 2(5) encompassed the entire spectrum of possibilities and to specifically
ensure that these types of organizations would be prohibited. See To Create a Na-
tional Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Ses. 241 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note
24, at 272; Staff of Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1935, supra note 24, at 1352.
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). For the full text of section 8(a)(2), see infra text ac-
companying note 69. As noted previously, the purpose of the NLRA was to protect
employees' free choice. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. If the employer
dominated the labor organization, then the representatives were really only the
mouthpiece for the employer, thereby destroying section 7 rights.
33. 79 CONG. REc. 7,565 (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB 1947, supra note 31, at 2333.
34. Id.; see supra note 27 (discussing the preamble to the NLRA).
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to eliminate the company union, it stressed that it did not intend to
eliminate employee groups that were formed independently of the em-
ployer by the employees.'
B. An Early Attempt to Permit Employee Participation Under the
NLRA
The concern over company unions continued to exist well into the
next decade as evidenced by the defeat of proposed amendments to the
NLRA when Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act in
19 4 7 .' One proposed amendment permitted an employer to form or
maintain a conuittee of employees to discuss mutual matters of inter-
est if no union had been recognized by the employer or certified by the
NLRB.3 7 Although this amendment passed in the House, its ultimate
defeat remained consistent with the desire to keep company unions out
35. 78 CONG. REc. 7,565, reprinted in 2 NLRB 1947, supra note 31, at 2333.
Nothing in the bill prohibits the formation of a company union, if by that
term is meant an organization of workers confined by their own volition to
the boundaries of a particular plant or employer. What is intended is to
make such organization the free choice of the workers, and not a choice dic-
tated by forms of interference which are weighty precisely because of the
existence of the employer-employee relationship.
H.R. REP. NO. 74-972, (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB 1947, supra note 31, at 2971-72.
36. 93 CONG. REC. 3,521 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOl
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1 NLRB 1947, at 601 (1948) [hereinafter 1 NLRB 1947].
Despite the defeat of an attempt to amend section 8(a)(2), enacted amendments ex-
panded the scope of employer-employee communications by allowing employers to re-
spond to their employees' grievance. See Smith, supra note 14, at 238.
37. H.R 3020, 80th Cong. (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB 1935, supra note 31, at
183. The amendment proposed the addition of section 8(d), which stated:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of
the provisions of this Act ... [florming or maintaining by an employer of a
committee of employees and discussing with it matters of mutual interest,
including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working condi-
tions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized a
representative as their representative under section 9.
Id.
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of the workplace.' These same arguments fuel the opposition to the
Team Act of 1997.'
I. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
SECTIONS 2(5) AND 8(A)(2)
The threshold determination that must be made before finding unlaw-
ful employer domination of an employee participation program is that
the group constitutes a "labor organization" within the meaning of sec-
tion 2(5) of the NLRA.' If a "labor organization" does exist, then a de-
termination must be made as to whether the employer dominates, inter-
feres with, or supports the organization.4' Understanding the judicial
and administrative interpretation of both sections is critical to an un-
derstanding of the current conflict surrounding employee participation
programs.
A. The Broad Interpretation of '"abor Organization"
Section 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act defines a labor orga-
nization as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with em-
ployers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment, or conditions of work."41
In its first case, the National Labor Relations Board addressed wheth-
er an employee organization was a labor organization within the mean-
ing of section 2(5).' The Board held that the employee association
38. 93 CONG. REC. 3,521 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB 1947, supra note 36, at 601.
Representative Klein, in opposition to the amendment, remarked that it "revive[d] the
right of an employer-long outlawed under existing law-to get him a company union
for the purpose of bucking legitimate self-organization." Id. at 654. The arguments
made against the early proposal to relax the ban created by sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)
are very similar to those made against the TEAM Act See iqfra note 149 and accom-
panying text.
39. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-7 (testimony of Jonathan P. Hiatt,
General Counsel, AFL-CIO). Mr. Hiatt commented that the TEAM Act would "allow
egregious forms of employer domination" and a resurgence of the company union. Id.
40. HARDIN, supra note 6, at 288; see irfra text accompanying note 42.
41. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
43. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.LRB. 1, 2 (1935). In that case, the
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constituted an employee representation plan under section 2(5) because
it was "entirely the creature of the management."" Although the Board
did not discuss the definition of "dealing with" in Pennsylvania Grey-
hound Lines, the meaning of that term is crucial to the analysis as to
whether a labor organization exists.45
In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,46 the Supreme Court interpreted the
term "dealing with" to include more than mere bargaining.47 Yet, aside
from its broad determination that a group that does not bargain with
the employer may nonetheless constitute a labor organization, the Court
failed to define "dealing with," leaving that determination for subse-
quent cases.' Following Cabot Carbon, the Board and the courts con-
tinued to broadly interpret "dealing with," which in turn led to a broad
interpretation of "labor organization."49 Perhaps recognizing that this
broad interpretation put section 8(a)(2) in conflict with employer pro-
grams designed to enhance employee involvement, the Board later nar-
employer formed an employee association for the specific purpose of representing
other employees in the discussion of controversial matters. Id. at 10. The employer
then determined fhe procedures for electing employee representatives and determined
the way in which matters would be resolved. Id, at 10-11.
44. Id. at 13. The employer created, planned, sponsored, and determined the
organization's functions, and then "foisted [it] upon employees who had never request-
ed" such an organization. Id. at 13-14. In addition, the Board noted that the employer
had conducted the representative elections and written its by-laws. Id. at 14. Upon
finding unlawful domination, the Board ordered the disestablishment of the organiza-
tion, an order which became the traditional remedy upon a finding of unlawful domi-
nation. Id. at 50-51; see, e.g., N.LR.B. v. Metropolitan Alloys Corp., 233 N.LR.B. 966,
970 (1977), enforced, 624 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 1980).
45. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 292.
46. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). Cabot Carbon involved an employee committee system in
which employee-elected representatives met with management to discuss "employee's
ideas and problems of mutual interest," including grievances and working conditions.
Id. at 205 & n.1. The topics of discussion included "seniority, job classification, job
bidding, working schedules, holidays ... and improvement of working ... condi-
tions." Id. at 213.
47. Id. at 211. The Court relied upon the legislative history of section 2(5) to es-
tablish that "dealing with" and "bargaining with" were not synonymous. Id, Specifical-
ly, the Court construed the rejection of a proposal that would replace the broad term
"dealing" with the more narrow term "bargaining collectively" as establishing
Congress's intention that the term "dealing with" should not be limited to "bargaining
with." Id. at 211-12.
48. See id.
49. See, e.g., Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc., 132 N.LR.B. 993, 994-95 (1961), en-
forced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962) (holding that an association that
presented employee views to management was a labor organization despite the fact
that it did not make any recommendations for management action); Ampex Corp., 168
N.LR.B. 742, 746-47 (1967) (holding that an employee committee with no formal
structure and random membership was a labor organization).
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rowed the scope of the term "labor organization" by creating several
narrow exceptions in a series of cases.'
One narrow exception permits employee groups to resolve grievances
provided that management has no involvement.6 ' In two separate cas-
es, the NLRB found that employee councils which heard employee
grievances were not "labor organizations" because both councils had
made independent decisions.' In this respect, the councils were per-
forming a management function, rather than "dealing with" manage-
ment.' In these cases, the Board affirmed the view that there is room
for some employer-employee communication without the danger of
creating a statutory labor organization.'
50. See Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.LRB. 275, 276-77 (1977); Mercy-Memorial Hosp.
Corp., 231 N.LRB. 1108, 1121 (1977); General Foods Corp., 231 N.LR.B. 1232, 1234-
35 (1977). These exceptions are relevant to the discussions surrounding employee
participation programs because they provide competing arguments concerning whether
or not certain types of programs are permissible.
51. Sparks Nugget, 230 N.LR.B. at 276; Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.LR.B. at
1108. This alleviates any "dealing with" management by the employees because the
group acts independently. See id.
52. See supra note 51. In Sparks Nugget, the NLRB found that a joint employer-
employee grievance council, structured almost entirely by management, did not "deal
with" the employer. Sparks Nugget, 230 N.LRB. at 276. The committee met only to
hear cases filed by individual employees and did not initiate grievances or recom-
mend changes in terms or conditions of employment. Id. The Board based its finding
on the fact that the council performed a "purely adjudicatory function," independently
resolving grievances without any input from or interaction with management other
than to report its decision. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Chairman Fanning stated that
dealing with an employer regarding any one of the matters in section 2(5) is sufi-
cient to support a finding that a labor organization exists, and he concluded that the
committee involved clearly dealt with management with respect to grievances. Id. at
277 (Fanning, Chairman, dissenting).
Following Sparks Nugget, the Board departed again from the broad interpretation
of "labor organization" with its decision in Mercy-Memorial Hosp. In Mercy Memorial
Hosp., the Board held that a joint employer-employee committee -that decided
grievances was not a labor organization despite the fact that the grievance determina-
tions were subject to appeal by the complainant and the committee had the "right
and obligation," according to the employer's policy, to recommend changes in rules,
regulations, and working conditions. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.LR.B. at 1108-09,
1121.
53. Sparks Nugget, 230 N.LRB. at 276; Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.LR.B. at
1121.
54. Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.LR.B. at 1121. The administrative law judge in
Mercy-Memorial Hosp. stated that "the committee was created simply to give employ-
ees a voice in resolving the grievances of their fellow employees . .-. not by present-
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Another exception created by the NLRB hinges on the absence of a
representative relationship between an employee group and the employ-
er.' In finding that employee "teams"' were not labor organizations,
the Board in General Foods noted that the "essence of a labor organiza-
tion" involves a representative relationship between the organization
and the employees involved. 7 In that case, the Board upheld the em-
ployer-created job enrichment program which included all members of
the bargaining unit.' The Board found that the teams' authority to reg-
ulate themselves resulted not from "dealings" between the teams and
the company, but from unilaterally delegated authority; thus, the pow-
ers constituted additional job duties.'
The Board's decisions in Sparks Nugget, Mercy-Memorial, and Gener-
al Foods established exceptions to the definition of "labor organization,"
which extend to any organization whose purpose is limited to per-
forming a managerial or adjudicative function.' The Sixth Circuit also
ing to or discussing or negotiating with management but by itself deciding the valid-
ity of the employees' complaints and the appropriateness of the disciplinary action, if
any, imposed." Id.
55. General Foods, 231 N.LRB. at 1234-35.
56. Id. The employer created four operating teams and other ad hoc committees,
whose membership came from different teams, to carry out specific and limited
functions including assigning jobs, job rotations, and scheduling overtime. Id. at 1236.
One group of employees interviewed job applicants, another inspected the plant and
reported safety infractions, and all teams were authorized to set their team's work
schedules. Id.
57. Id. at 1234-35. The lack of agency status is important because it shows that
employees retained their freedom of choice of representatives under section 7. See
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.LR.B. 990, 998 (1992), entforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cu.
1994). The judge also found support for his decision in the fact that the employer's
motive in organizing the teams had nothing to do with labor relations but rather in-
volved efficiency. See General Foods, 231 N.LRB. at 1234. Opponents of the TEAM
Act argue that the General Foods decision clearly permits employees to engage in
"brain work" and to assist employers in making workplace decisions. Selected Testi-
mony, supra note 1, at *10.
58. General Foods, 231 N.LR.B. at 1235. Some commentators view this case as an
example of the fact that employers can lawfully use employee participation programs,
while others note the narrowness of the exception and point out that the case leaves
questions unanswered. See Estsrcher, supra note 27, at 140-41.
59. General Foods, 231 N.LRB. at 1235. The Board found that these managerial
functions were "flatly delegated" to the employees and therefore no employer involve-
ment existed in the performance of these job duties. Id.
60. Aside from these few cases narrowly construing the definition of labor organi-
zation, the Board has generally found that when an employer creates an organization
and determines its structure and agenda so that the organization has no existence
independent of the employer, the organization constitutes a labor organization. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 168 N.LRB. 742, 746-47 (1967) (holding that an employee
committee with no formal structure and random membership was a labor organiza-
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addressed the distinction between "legitimate managerial initiatives and
impermissible support for an organization" by creating its own excep-
tion, refusing to enforce the Board's decision on the issue. 1 Although
the Board's decisions have been met with judicial approval in most
jurisdictions, the Sixth Circuit, with its departure from Board interpreta-
tion, followed a different path.
In NLRB v. Streamway, the employer established an in-plant commit-
tee, provided representatives, and adjusted its vacation eligibility policy
after a committee meeting.' Although the Board found that a labor
organization existed, the Sixth Circuit determined that the committee
was not a labor organization, but rather was merely a "communicative
device."' The court based its finding on the fact that the employee
groups spoke directly with management on an individual, rather than on
a representative, basis and that neither the employees nor the commit-
tee members considered the committee a labor organization."
Similarly, in NLRB v. Airstream, the Sixth Circuit declined to enforce
the Board's order that an employee committee be disestablished be-
cause it was an employer-dominated labor organization.' In Air-
stream, the employer formed a "President's Advisory Council," told the
employees to choose representatives, and discussed an attendance bo-
tion); Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc., 132 N.LRB. 993, 994-95 (1961) (holding that
an association that presented employee views to management was a labor organiza-
tion despite the fact that it did not make any recommendations for management ac-
tion).
61. HARDIN, supra note 6, at 297; see Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th
Cir. 1989), denying enforcement to 288 N.LR.B. 220 (1988); NLRB v. Streamway Div.
of Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to 249
N.LRB. 396 (1980).
62. Streamway, 691 F.2d at 290.
63. Id. at 295; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.LR.B. 893, 894
(1993) (noting that employee groups that simply share information with an employer
would not be deemed labor organizations); Sears Roebuck & Co., 274 N.LR.B. 230
(1985) (holding that an employer's "communications committee" was not a labor orga-
nization because the purpose of the committee was to be a management tool intend-
ed to increase company efficiency rather than to be a representative of the employ-
ees).
64. Streamway, 691 F.2d at 295-96. Although the Board held differently, this out-
come seems consistent with the Board's view in General Foods that absence of a
representative relationship precludes a finding of a labor organization. See supra
notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
65. Airstream, 877 F.2d at 1300.
1303
nus system with the representatives.' In determining that a labor orga-
nization did not exist, the Sixth Circuit followed its decision in
Streamway, holding that even though the employer created the council
at approximately the same time that an independent organizational
drive was taking place, this council did not take any action during the
pendency of the organizational drive and the action did not affect
employees' rights.67
The Sixth Circuit's approach in these cases indicates that the ad-
versarial relationship between employers and employees is diminishing
and that where a program involves legitimate managerial functions, the
cooperative relationship should not be disturbed by a finding that a
labor organization exists.'
B. Approaches to Defining Employer Domination Under Section
8(a)(2)
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organi-
zation or contribute financial or other support to it Provided, That subject to
rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 156 of
this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer
with him during working hours without loss of time or pay.'
Three approaches for determining whether employer domination exists
under section 8(a)(2) have evolved: the objective approach, the subjec-
tive approach, and a hybrid approach.
Under the, objective approach, domination of a labor organization is
inferred if management sets up the committees and management approv-
al is necessary for committee action to be effective." In Newport News,
66. Id. at 1294.
67. Id. at 1298-99.
68. See HARDIN, supra note 6, at 297. The Board's decisions in Sparks Nugget,
Mercy-Memorial Hospital, and General Foods, as well as the Sixth Circuit's decisions
in Streamway and Airstream, are significant to the current controversy surrounding
employee participation programs. See id. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION: FINAL REPORT
(1989).
69. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
70. NLRB v. Newport News, Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 249-60
(1939). In Newport News, the Court affirmed the Board's use of an "objective test"
for determining if domination exists. Id. at 249. As the basis of its determination, the
Court cited the effect of the employer's control over the form and structure of the
organization in depriving employees of the complete freedom of action under section
7. Id. The Court noted that
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an employer created an employee committee to "give employees a voice
in respect of the conditions of their labor and. to provide a procedure for
the prevention and adjustment of future differences."7 Several joint
committees comprised of employees and management administered the
plan, and the management representatives acted as a liaison between
management and the representatives.' Affirming the decision of the
Board, the United States Supreme Court found that because the employ-
er had created the committee and continued to require management
approval before any committee action would be effective, it was employ-
er-dominated. 7
In the 1950s, the Seventh Circuit departed from the Board's less flexi-
ble objective test in favor of a subjective or "actual domination" ap-
proach in Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB.74 Rejecting a
per se approach, the court focused on whether the employee organiza-
tion was employer-controlled from the standpoint of the employees.75 In
Chicago Rawhide, the court refused to enforce the Board's order for dis-
establishment," holding that an employees' association that worked out
employee grievances was not a labor organization because the idea origi-
[wihile the men are free to adopt any form of organization and representa-
tion whether purely local or connected with a national body, their purpose
so to do may be obstructed by the existence and recognition by the manage-
ment of an old plan or organization the original structure or operation of
which was not in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Id. at 250; cf. Duquesne Univ., 198 N.LR.B. 891, 892-93 (1972) (holding that only un-
lawful assistance, rather than domination, existed where the employees determined
the structure and function, of the employer-initiated committee). See generally HARDIN,
supra note 6, at 298-305, for a detailed analysis of the domination approaches.
71. Newport News, 308 U.S. at 244.
72. Id. at 244-45.
73. Id. at 249.
74. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
75. Id. at 168. Although Chicago Rawhide appears to make it easier for employers
to lawfully implement employee participation programs, the decision does not provide
a sufficient basis to uphold these programs because the case did not involve the kind
of employer involvement that is necessary to set up and maintain a successful pro-
gram. McLain, supra note 2, at 1757-58.
76. The court noted that "[n]either mere cooperation, preference nor possibility of
control constitute unfair labor practices; and the Board may not infer conduct viola-
tive of the Act from conduct that is not, unless there is a substantial basis, in fact
or reason, for that inference." Chicago Rawhide, 221 F.2d at 168. In this case, the
acts for which the employer was charged with domination constituted no more than
cooperation with the employee association. Id.
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nated with the employees and the employees did not believe that the
employer controlled them." The Seventh Circuit continued to follow
this approach, which several other circuits later adopted.'
Just over a decade later, the hybrid approach emerged. The Sixth Cir-
cuit departed from the Newport News approach in Modern Plastics Corp.
v. NLRB, where it applied an "objective test" and a "subjective test" to
determine whether employer domination existed.7 9 In Modern Plastics,
the company's plant consisted of six groups, each of which were repre-
sented by an elected committee representative.' Under the hybrid ap-
proach, a finding of employer domination requires (1) an objective find-
ing of actual domination, which may be established by evidence of anti-
union bias, and (2) a subjective finding of active domination from the
employees' point of view.8' Despite the fact that the employer estab-
lished the employee committee and the committee engaged in collective
bargaining, the court found no domination.' The court based its deci-
sion on its findings that there was no anti-union animus shown by the
employer and that the employees did not feel the employer dominated
the committees.'
77. Id. at 167-68.
78. See, e.g., Modem Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); Continental
Distilling Sales Co., 348 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1965). In 1977, the Ninth Circuit also de-
parted from the Newport News "objective test" and instead applied a relaxed "subjec-
tive test" to determine whether an employer dominated an employee committee.
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 1974), denying enforcement
to 206 N.LR.B. 191 (1973). In Hertzca & Knowles, the court determined that a find-
ing of domination requires actual domination, as determined from an employee's per-
spective, rather than inferred domination. Id. at 630. In this case, the court found no
domination because employees still had retained freedom of choice. Id,
79. Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 204. Similar to the test used in Modern Plastics,
the NLRB applied a more relaxed totality of the circumstances test in Duquesne
Univ., 198 N.LR.B. 891, 893 (1972), where it found only unlawful assistance because
the employees, rather than the employer, determined the structure and formation of
the committee. Id.
80. Modern Plastics, 379 F.2d at 202. The employee committee served as the bai-
gaining representative for the employees for over ten years, negotiating with the com-
pany on "a number of collective-bargaining agreements" when an outside union
sought to organize the company's employees. Id.
81. Id. at 204 (citing Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1955)).
82. Id. The court noted that the company and the committee worked well together
for many years and that permitting the Board to disrupt that relationship simply be-
cause another union wanted to come into the company would be a disservice to the
employees. Id. at 204-05.
83. Id.
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C. The New Era of Electromation, Inc.
Electromation,s which represents the Board's reaffirmation of previ-
ously established interpretations of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2), bolstered
the current controversy surrounding employee participation plans.' In
Electromation, the management of the company involved employees in
company decisions by creating five "action committees" for which man-
agement set the goals and responsibilities.' Both the employees and
management representatives served on these committees.' The NLRB
found that these committees constituted labor organizations because
they were dealing with the employer concerning conditions of employ-
ment.' The NLRB further found that the employer dominated the orga-
nizations because management organized the committees and determined
the nature, structure, and functions!' The majority opinion emphasized
that the bilateral mechanism by which employees made proposals to
management, which could then be accepted or rejected, was the crucial
element in establishing the "dealing with" requirement under section
2(5).' While the four opinions in Electromation provided little guidance
84. 309 N.LRB. 990 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). See generally
Dennis M. Devaney, Much Ado About Section 8(a)(2): The NLRB and Workplace
Cooperation After Electromation and du Pont, 23 STErrSON L REv. 39 (1993) (examin-
ing the Electromation and E.I. du Pont decisions).
85. See S.P. Dinnen, House OKs NLRB Changes Prompted by Indiana Case, INDIA-
NAPOus STAR, Sept. 30, 1995, at E8.
86. Electromation, 309 N.LR.B. at 991.
87. Id. The five action committees were created to handle the following issues: (1)
absenteeism and infractions; (2) a no-smoking policy; (3) a communication network,
(4) pay progression for premium positions; and (4) an attendance bonus program. Id.
88. Id, at 997.
89. Id These management controls were inconsistent with the structural indepen-
dence required by Newport News. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. De-
spite the Board's finding of an unlawfully dominated labor organization, the majority
opinion suggested that where the purpose of the committee is limited to improving
quality or efficiency, or to act as a communicative device to promote efficiency or
quality, a violation would not be found. Electromation, 309 N.LR.B. at 997 n.28. This
suggestion undermined the arguments made by proponents of the TEAM Act that the
Electromation decision prevents employers from implementing such programs. See
inftu notes 178-80 and accompanying text When viewed in light of the chilling effect
that Electromation has had on employers and the reduction of employee participation
programs in its wake, the TEAM Act would still serve an important purpose by re-
moving that chilling effect. See Dinnen, supra note 85, at E8.
90. Electromation, 309 N.LRB. at 997. The Board noted that the only purpose of
the committees was to deal with the dissatisfaction of employees through the cre-
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for employers as to the applicable criteria for determining whether an
employee participatioh committee is a dominated labor organization, the
concurring opinions shed some light on the types of conunittees that
may be acceptable under the NLRA 1
In his concurring opinion, Member Devaney emphasized that section
8(a)(2) should not be a barrier to employee participation programs as
long as the programs do not impair the right of employees to their free
choice of a bargaining representative.' Member Devaney contrasted the
type of action committee involved in Electromation with committees
concerning "productivity, efficiency, materials conservation, safety and
the like."' He noted that precedent suggests that an employee group
may be lawful where it exists only for employee goal-setting and self-
regulation, to perform managerial functions and grievance resolution, or
to act as a management tool to increase efficiency in communications.'
Member Oviatt emphasized practical guidelines, and he stressed a wide
range of lawful activities he viewed as untouched by the decision, such
as quality circles, problem-solving structures, and committees to create
better communications." In his view, the critical question in cases in-
volving violations of section 8(a)(2) for employee participation programs
is whether the purpose is to "deal with" any of the enumerated subjects
in section (2)(5).' Further, Member Oviatt specifically recognized that
programs such as quality circles, quality of work-life programs, and em-
ployee-management cooperative programs do not implicate section
2(5).9
ation of a bilateral process involving employees and management to reach solutions
based on employee proposals. Id. The Board also determined that the committees
were acting in a representational capacity, therefore constituting "'employee represen-
tation committee[s] or plan[s]' as set forth in Section 2(5)." Id.
91. For a detailed analysis of the Electromation decision, see generally Steven l.
Locke, Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA Intact: A Fresh Look at
Worker Participation Committees Through Electromation, Inc., 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L..
375 (1992) (discussing Electromation).
92. Electromation, 309 N.LR.B. at 1003. This view follows the Sixth Circuit ap-
proach in NLRB v. Streamway, 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to
249 N.LR.B. 396 (1980).
93. Electromation, 309 N.LR.B. at 1003.
94. Id. at 1001-02; see supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text.
95. Electromation, 309 N.LRB. at 1004.
96. Id. These matters include "'grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours of employment or conditions of worl'" Id. (quoting § 2(5)).
97. Id. The employee committees that are established for the purpose of creating
better communications between the employer and employee, although viewed as pro-
tected by Member Oviatt, are the exact ,type of committees that are in the most
danger of being perceived as labor organizations under section 2(5).
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Finally, Member Radabaugh, going beyond a mere analysis of existing
law, suggested that section 8(a)(2) should be reinterpreted by the legisla-
ture in light of the growing importance of employee participation pro-
grams and cooperation between labor and management.' He also of-
fered a four-part analysis for determining whether employee participation
programs are lawful.' In Member Radabaugh's view, the four factors for
consideration, none of which are dispositive, are (1) the extent of the
employer's involvement in implementing the committees, (2) whether the
employees reasonably perceive the participation program as a substitute
for collective bargaining through an independent union, (3) whether
employees have been assured of their Section 7 right to choose represen-
tation by an independent union, and (4) the employer's motives in estab-
lishing the employee participation program."°
One year after the Board decided Etectromation, it faced a somewhat
different situation in E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.,"°' where it had
the opportunity to provide some concrete guidance regarding the defini-
tion of a labor organization and the employer domination analysis."° In
that case, employees in a unionized company participated in safety com-
mittees, which made proposals to management for their approval or
rejection."° Based primarily on the fact that management could reject
the proposals, the Board found that the committees constituted labor
organizations."° The Board emphasized the existence of a bilateral
mechanism between two parties as the focal point in determining that
the groups were "dealing with" the employer, and stated that a "'bilateral
mechanism' ordinarily entails a pattern or practice in which a group of
employees, over time, makes proposals to management, management
98. Id. at 1013.
99. Id. In proposing this test, Member Radabaugh sought to accommodate labor-
management participation while keeping employees' section 7 rights intact. Id.
100. Id. Opponents of the TEAM Act cite the lack of preservation of employees'
section 7 rights as the major flaw in the Act. See infra notes 149-50 and accompany-
ing text.
101. 311 N.LIRB. 893 (1993).
102. Id. at 894, 895-97. This case provided the Board the opportunity to address
issues raised by employee participation programs in the unionized workplace. Id. at
893-98.
103. Id. at 894-95.
104. Id. at 895.
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responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by word or deed,
and compromise is not required." 5
Expanding on this definition in an attempt to provide the guidance
lacking in Electromation, the Board articulated three employment situa-
tions that fail to meet the requirements of "dealing with." First,
"brainstorming" is not akin to "dealing with" because the employees are
not maldng proposals."° Second, a comnuittee whose purpose is sharing
information with the employer is not dealing with the employer."7
Third, the Board noted that suggestion boxes are clearly not mechanisms
for "dealing with" the employer, despite the fact that employees make
proposals, because they are not making them as a group."° Based upon
this analysis, the Board found quarterly all-day safety conferences held
by the employer permissible because the conferences amounted to brain-
storming sessions during which attempts were clearly made to prohibit
discussion of bargaining issues."i
Even though E.L du Pont took place in a unionized setting, this deci-
sion provided a small amount of guidance to employers regarding permis-
sible forms of communication. Many believe that this guidance falls
short, as evidenced by proposals to amend the NLRA to enable employ-
ers to involve employee groups in decision making without fear of corn-
mitting unfair labor practices." ° Opponents of the TEAM Act argue that
E.L du Pont shows that employers can implement employee participation
structures under existing law without this fear."' This decision, howev-
er, only provides a narrow exception to the expansive reach of the
Electromation decision."
2
D. Employee Participation in The Wake of Electromation
Since the decision in Electromation, the need for clarification of the
legality of employee participation programs has become evident."3 In
105. Id. at 894.
106. Id. at 894-95.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Board noted that the "dealing" element is absent when, without evi-
dence of a pattern, the employee group proposes ideas informally to management fol-
lowed by management's response of acceptance or rejection. Id.
109. Id. at 896.
110. See infra Part IV.
111. See infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
113. The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations suggested in
its January 9, 1995, report that Congress clarify the NLRA and remove legal obstacles
to enable employers to freely engage in participation programs. See Cimini & Muhi,
supra note 14, at 78 (summarizing the Dunlop Report).
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recent years the Board has considered charges involving the employee in-
volvement efforts of some leading companies in the country and ques-
tioned the legality of these efforts." 4 Continuing its reliance on the
Electromation decision, the Board found that employee participation pro-
grams constituted illegally dominated labor organizations in four of six
recent rulings." 5 .
In Keeler Brass Automotive Group,"' the Board held that a grievance
committee comprised of elected employees was an employer-dominated
labor organization and ordered its disestablishment."7 The Board, rely-
ing on its interpretation of "dealing with" in Electromation,"' found a
bilateral mechanism existed by which the committee engaged in a pat-
tern or practice of submitting proposals to management for approval or
rejection."9 In further reliance on its decision in Electromation, the
Board found that management dominated the organization because it
initiated the committee and determined its structure, function, and con-
tinued existence.' °
114. See H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 13-14 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823 (not-
ing the section 8(a)(2) charges against Donnelly Corporation and Polaroid Corpora-
tion, both of which the Department of Labor cited as one of the 100 best companies
to work for in America, as well as against EFCO Corporation).
115. Labor-Management Cooperation: Labor Board Issues Five Rulings on Employee
Involvement Committees, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at D6 (Feb. 8, 1996); see
Vons Grocery Co., 320 N.LR.B. 53 (1995) (discussed infra notes 136-38 and accompa-
nying text); Stoody Co., 320 N.LR.B. 18 (1995) (discussed infra notes 132-35 and ac-
companying text); Dillon Stores, 319 N.LR.B. 1245 (1995) (discussed irtfra notes 124-
26 and accompanying text); Webcor Packaging, Inc., 319 N.LRB. 1203 (1995) (dis-
cussed iftra notes 121-23 and accompanying text); Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 319
N.LRB. 1154 (1995) (discussed infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text); Keeler
Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.LR.B. 1110 (1995) (discussed infra notes 116-20 and
accompanying text). The cases in which the Board found an employer-dominated
labor organization all contain aspects similar to the facts in Electromation.
116. 317 N.LRB. 1110 (1995).
117. Keeler Brass, 317 N.LR.B. at 1114, 1116. It is interesting to note that the
Board deciding Keeler Brass consisted of four Board members who were not on the
Board at the time of the Electromation decision. See id. at 1110;.Electromation, Inc.,
309 N.LR.B. 990 (1992), enforced, 335 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
118. See supra note 84-90 and accompanying text.
119. Keeler Brass, 317 N.LR.B. at 1113.
120. Id. at 1115. The Board noted that the employer's involvement could not be
characterized as 'mere cooperation.'" Id. at 1115 n.21 (quoting Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1165-66 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955))); see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
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In Webcor Packaging, Inc.,2' the Board upheld a finding that an em-
ployer-established plant council, which offered recommendations to man-
agement about proposed changes in working conditions, was not merely
a communications mechanism but rather was engaged in the pattern or
practice of making recommendations for management's consider-
ation.' Again following Electromation, the Board found domination of
the committee because the employer founded the committee and deter-
mined its structure and function."2
Similarly, in Dillon Stores,"2 the Board held that an employee-elected
associates committee, which discussed and made regular proposals re-
garding a wide range of work issues including scheduling and sick leave
reimbursement, constituted a labor organization because the employer
could accept or reject its proposals. 2 ' Additionally, the Board found
that management dominated the committee because the employer initiat-
ed the committee and determined its structure and function."
Finally, in Reno Hilton Resorts Corp.,'27 the Board upheld a finding
that quality action teams established by the employer were labor organi-
zations."2 Despite the fact that most of the meetings covered other top-
ics, the team dealt with management "concerning wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of work.""2 The Board also determined that man-
agement dominated the quality action teams because the company's gen-
eral manager determined their size and structure, paid employees to
attend the meetings, and developed the agendas for the meetings."3
While four of the six recent cases in which the Board found employer-
dominated organizations contained very similar situations, the two cases
in which the Board did not find labor organizations involved significantly
different scenarios. 3 ' In Stoody Co., the Board found that an em-
121. 319 N.LR.B. 1203 (1995).
122. Id. at 1204. The Board noted that the council had no effective existence inde-
pendent of the management's involvement and approval. Id. Employees will not be
independently implementing most employee participation programs because the nature
of the employment relationship will still require that employers be involved with the
group's regular operations.
123. Id.
124. 319 N.LRB. 1245 (1995).
125. Id. at 1251-52.
126. Id. at 1252.
127. 319 N.LRB. 1154 (1995).
128. Id. at 1157.
129. Id. at 1156-57. Section 2(5) defines a labor organization as an organization that
exists, even in part, for the purpose of dealing with the employer concerning "griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1994).
130. Reno Hilton, 319 N.LR.B. at 1157.
131. See if'ra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
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ployee handbook committee, created to review the company handbook
for consistency with current work practices, was not a labor organiza-
tion." The Board emphasized the fact that management specifically in-
structed the committee not to discuss wages, benefits, or working condi-
tions."3 The Board also stated that it "support[s] an interpretation of
the Act which would not discourage such programs," but the Board cau-
tioned that recurring instances of employee participation committees
making proposals to management on mandatory subjects would support
a finding that a labor organization exists.'"
In Vons Grocery Co., the Board held that a brief discussion on a
mandatory topic by a quality circle group, which was established to dis-
cuss specific operational issues, did not render the group a labor organi-
zation. 7 The Board noted that the group did not have a pattern or
practice of making proposals on mandatory subjects and that making one
proposal on a condition of work did not constitute a pattern of dealing
with the employer within the meaning of section 2(5)."
In light of the confusion created by Electromation and the indications
that the Board will continue to adhere to that decision, the need for a
legislative amendment to the NLRA has become increasingly clear. En-
actment of the TEAM Act would remove the legal uncertainty surround-
ing these programs and enable employers to involve employee groups in
decisions concerning areas of mutual interests, including product quality,
productivity, and efficiency."
IV. THE TEAMWORK FOR EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS Acr OF 1997140
The introduction of the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of
1997 in the House and the Senate in February 1997141 signaled the rec-
132. 320 N.LRB. 18 (1995).
133. Id. at 19-20.
134. Id. at 20-21. The Board did note that it is difficult to separate such issues as
operations and efficiency from the matters of wages, benefits, or worldng conditions.
Id. at 20.
135. Id. at 20-21.
136. 320 N.LRB. 53 (1995).
137. Id. at 53-54.
138. Id. at 54.
139. See ifra Part IV.
140. H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997).
141. 143 CONG. REc. E187 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1997) (statement of Rep. Fawell); 143
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ognition of the continuing need to resolve the legality of employee partic-
ipation programs. Identical legislation, known as the TEAM Act of 1995,
passed both houses of Congress in 1996, only to be vetoed by President
Clinton. 42 The 1997 Act once again proposes to amend section 8(a)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Act to "allow labor management coopera-
tive efforts [in the nonunion workplace] that improve economic competi-
tiveness in the United States."" The stated purpose of the Act is to
protect employers from governmental interference while not compromis-
ing employees' section 7 rights to be protected from coercive and de-
ceptive employer practices.' Many oppose the Act, claiming that it
amounts to union-busting and will open the door for the return of
"company unions," which the NLRA sought to prevent in the 1930s.45
The text of the Act would amend section 8(a)(2) to include the follow-
ing:
Provided furwr, That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor
practice under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or
participate in any organization or entity of any kind, in which employees who
participate to at least the same extent practicable as representatives of manage-
ment participate, to address matters of mutual interest, including, but not limited
to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and health, and which
does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agree-
ments between the employer and any labor organization, except that in a case in
which a labor organization is the representative of such employees as provided in
section 9(a), this proviso shall not apply."
The TEAM Act proponents recognize that a shift in employment rela-
tions from adversarial to cooperative efforts has taken place over the last
six decades.'47 This Act removes the barriers employers previously
CONG. REC. S1192 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1997) (statement of Sen. Jeffords).
142. 142 CONG. REC. H8816 (daily ed. July 30, 1996) (recitation. by the Speaker pro
tempore Mclnnis of the Presidential veto).
143. H.R. 634 § 2; S. 295 § 2. In its findings, Congress presents compelling reasons
for opening the door to expansive employee participation programs, including the
demands of global competition, enhanced productivity and competitiveness, and a
generally positive impact on workers. H.R. 634 § 2; S. 295 § 2. Changes in the
workplace in response to "escalating demands" of the global economy necessarily
involve enhanced role for employees. H.R. 634 § 2; S. 295 § 2.
144. H.R. 634; S. 295. The Act provides that employees will retain their right to
choose an independent union and further provides that the Act is not applicable to
unionized workplaces. See id.
145. See Tench, supra note 18, at A18. The force of the arguments against the Act
rely on a backward-looking analysis of the events and conditions of the 1930s that
led to company unions and the need to ban employer domination. See 141 CONG.
REC. H9531 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Gephardt).
146. H.R. 634 § 3; S. 295 § 3.
147. Congress enacted the NLRA based on the adversarial model of employment
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faced to initiating cooperative efforts in the workplace, including joint
problem-solving and productivity, and quality improvements."4 On the
other hand, the pro-union opponents of the Act fear that its passage only
encourages employers to implement and dominate employee participa-
tion programs in an effort to impede legitimate union organizing ef-
forts.
14
If the TEAM Act fails, its demise will be attributed to both the per-
ceived lack of specific protection against an employer's attempts to im-
plement employee participation programs in the face of union organiza-
tional drives and to the use of broad language to describe the types of
matters these groups could address."w
Despite the polarization of views regarding the TEAM Act, both sides
recognize the importance of employer-employee participation and the
need to find ways to improve efficiency, productivity and quality so that
American companies may compete effectively as we enter the twenty-
first century. 5' The main point of contention lies in the determination
relations. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. More than six decades later,
the time has come for a change from the labor era and top-down decision making to
a workplace era where employee involvement in decision making is the norm. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 5-6 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
148. TEAM Act Would Remove Barriers to Workplace Cooperation, PR NEWSWIRE,
Sept 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, ALLNEWS Library [hereinafter Bar-
riers].
149. David Warner, Giving Employees a Voice on the Job, NATION'S Bus., Sept. 1995,
at 38; see Administration: Reich Reaches Out to Labor Unions for Help in Combat-
ting GOP Proposals, 189 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 189, at A-2 (Sept. 29, 1995)
[hereinafter Reich Reaches Out]. Opponents believe that the TEAM Act would under-
mine employee protections in two major ways. First, the Act would allow "nonunion
employees to establish sham unions," and, second, the Act would allow "other em-
ployees to establish company-dominated alternative organizations while employees are
in the process of [seeking independent union representation]." 141 CoNG. REc. H9526
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Owens). If the TEAM Act passes, many
fear that employee participation programs will merely be used by "unscrupulous man-
agers to bypass legitimate worker representative organizations." 141 CONG. REC. H9532
(daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statements by Rep. Skaggs). These arguments are very
similar to those made during the Taft-Hartley debates. See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text. Employees today, however, are more aware of their rights to
organize under the NLRA and could probably determine if a "company union" existed
that was not working to their benefit. See Gillian Flynn, Is Pro-Worker Good Busi-
ness?, 75 PERSONNEL J. 66, Oct. 1, 1996, at 66.
150. See H.R. 634; S. 295; supra text accompanying note 146.
151. 141 CONG. REC. H9527, H9529 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep.
Houghton and Rep. Sanders).
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of how to achieve those goals in a way that minimizes the intrusion on
employees' rights to free choice of representation.
A. Analysis of the TEAM Act
Three key provisions, when combined, will permit employers to lawful-
ly implement employee participation programs. The first provision deals
with the role of the employer in creating the programs. Whereas the
current section 8(a)(2) prohibits an employer from "dominat[ing] or
interfer[ing] with the formation or administration of any labor organi-
zation,"' 2 the proposed revision would permit employers to "establish,
assist, maintain, or participate in any organization of any kind."'" Al-
though this language appears broad, the clauses following that language
reduce its scope by limiting the permissible organizations to those in
which employees participate in equal numbers as managers."
The second major provision of the Act involves the matters upon
which employee participation programs may make decisions. The Act
provides that employee participation groups may "address matters of
mutual interest."'" Although the Act specifically mentions issues involv-
ing the overall productivity, efficiency, and safety in the workplace, the
Act does not place a limit on the types of issues that may be
discussed.'" This lack of specificity will permit discussions pertaining
to the mentioned topics to encompass discussions on issues involving
the terms and conditions of work.'57 As noted by former Board member
Charles I. Cohen, discussions of these previously off-limits subjects are
inevitable in light of the fact that work conditions affect productivity and
efficiency, and therefore, they should be permissible.'" An employer's
ability to discuss these issues with employees will enable the employer
to realize the full potential of these programs.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
153. H.R. 634; S. 295.
154. H.R. 634; S. 295. This limitation provides that managers will not outnumber the
employees in any given group, thereby avoiding outright domination. See H.R. 634; S.
295. Although this clause alone does not guarantee that the managers on the com-
mittee will refrain from presenting the employer's view, to the extent that employees
are not satisfied with outcomes, they will always be able to seek union representa-
tion. See H.R. 634; S. 295; ivfin note 159.
155. H.RF 634; S. 295.
156. See H.R 634; S. 295.
157. See H.R 634; S. 295. Even the NLRB acknowledges that discussions of this
type will inevitably arise when addressing issues such as productivity and efficiency.
See Stoody Co., 320 N.LR.B. 18, 19 (1995).
158. Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-4.
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The third key provision, which requires that the employee participation
organizations not "have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter...
or amend collective bargaining agreements," addresses the concern that
employers may attempt to use employee participation programs to de-
stroy employees' rights to independent union representation."5 Employ-
ee participation programs are not a substitute for independent represen-
tation. Further, the language of the Act indicates that the amendment to
section 8(a)(2) will not apply in unionized companies.
Enactment of this Act will permit employers to lawfully engage in
bilateral communications with their employees to further the goals of
enhanced productivity, quality, and safety. To the extent that discussion
of these issues requires discussions relating to the terms and conditions
of work, such communication will be permitted under the Act, and justi-
fiably so."
Under the Act, several of the post-Electromation cases in which the
Board found unlawful employer domination of employee participation
programs would have had a different and better outcome. For example,
where employee grievance committees do not fall within the narrow
exceptions created by the Board because of the fact that they involve
bilateral communications between the employer and employees, 6' such
committees would now be permitted to lawfully engage in communica-
tions with the employer."8 Similarly, employer-established councils that
offer recommendations to management on terms and conditions of work
for management consideration also would be lawful.63 Clearly, the
159. See H.R. 634; S. 295. The fact that a lawful employee participation group can-
not seek to be the exclusive bargaining representative should put to rest the stated
fear of TEAM Act opponents that the Act would permit a return to the "sham un-
ions" of the 1930s. See H.R. 634; S. 295. The continued opposition to the Act in light
of this clause emphasizes the fact that its opponents fail to recognize the ability of
employees to seek representation if they find it necessary.
160. See H.R. 634; S. 295.
161. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
162. See .R. 634; S. 295. For example, the type of employee grievance conunittee
involved in Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.LR.B. 1110 (1995), would now be
permissible. See H.R. 634; S. 295; supra notes 116-20.
163. See H.R. 634; S. 295. The same situation was present in Webcor Packaging,
Inc., 319 N.LR.B. 1203 (1995). In that case, the Board held that the employer-created
council's pattern of making recommendations to management constituted an unfair
labor practice. Id at 1204; see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. Dillon
Stores, 319 N.LRB. 1245 (1995), and Reno Hilton Resorts Corp., 320 N.LR.B. 1154
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TEAM Act fosters the type of employer-employee communication that
both proponents and opponents of the Act agree are needed.'" None-
theless, opponents of the TEAM Act ignore the realities of the workplace
of the 1990s and blindly argue that this Act would destroy workers'
rights. 
65
B. The TEAM Act Will Enhance Employees' Voices in the Nonunion
Workplace
Under the TEAM Act, employers would be free to implement employee
participation programs provided the employees participate to the same
extent as managers and provided that these organizations do not attempt
to perform the functions of a traditional bargaining representative."
Although almost 30,000 employers already have employee participation
programs in place, the Act would protect these employers from unfair
labor practice charges for illegal domination."7 Giving employers and
employees the freedom to work in this cooperative manner will have
great advantages in terms of productivity, quality improvement, and em-
ployee morale. The Act will permit employers and employees to real-
ize these advantages by explicitly protecting employees' right to choose
union representation while empowering them to become involved in
decisions affecting their work.166
Employers are not the only parties who want the freedom to engage in
employee participation programs. Indeed, an overwhelming number of
employees favor employee participation programs that will give them the
ability to communicate with management while allowing them to retain
their section 7 rights.17 Passage of the TEAM Act would send employ-
(1995), involved similar situations. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text All
of these cases would likely be decided differently under the TEAM Act.
164. See infra note 172 and accompanying text
165. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 6-7 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
166. H.R. 634; S. 295; see H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 5 (1995), available in 1995 WL
560823; U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations: Report and Recommendations, (1994); Walpole-Hof-
meister, supra note 12, at D-14. The passage of the TEAM Act would resolve the
problem that currently exists due to the fact that employers in a nonunion workplace
can legally implement unilateral changes regarding terms and conditions of work
without consulting employees, while in a unionized workplace employees can legally
control decisions through the union. 141 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)
(remarks of Rep. Goodling). The TEAM Act will establish a compromise position by
allowing employer-employee cooperative efforts in nonunion workplaces. Id.
167. H.R. 634; S. 295; Warner, supra note 149, at 38.
168. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 6-7 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
169. See Warner, supra note 149, at 38.
170. Seventy-six percent of workers surveyed in 1994 believed that their involvement
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ees the positive message that their input is vital to the success of the
companies for which they work.'
71
Parties on both sides of this debate agree that employees deserve to
have a "voice" on the job."7 The debate rages on, however, mainly be-
cause the two sides cannot agree from whom this voice should be heard.
The proponents of the TEAM Act believe that the workers have the pow-
er and should have the ability to use their own voices through employee
participation programs.1" Opponents fail to acknowledge that this voice
does in fact exist. Representatives of organized labor believe that this
voice will only be effectively heard if it comes from an independent
source-namely the union.'
The reality under the TEAM Act is that employees can still seek that
independent voice--if they need it.'76 Just as employees have sought
union representation when they have felt that they have been treated un-
fairly in the past, employees in companies with employee participation
programs can still seek an independent voice if the participation does
not work.
in decisions relating to production and operations would improve the competitiveness
of their companies, and 7996 reported having "personally benefitted" from the process.
H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 5 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823 (citing Freeman &
Rogers, supra note 4. Employee support for the Act also emanates from the fact that
employees have a vested interest in improving the competitiveness of their companies
and the stability of their futures. 141 CONG. REc. H9525 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995)
(remarks of Rep. Stenholm).
171. 141 CONG. REC. H9533 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
172. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at *4, E-1 to E-2, E-7.
173. Id. at E-1 to E-2 (testimony of J. Thomas Bouchard, Senior Vice President,
Human Resources, IBM). Mr. Bouchard noted that although IBM has been successful
with the employee participation programs it has implemented, the employees could
do much more to help management make IBM a better place to work. Id. at E-2. He
noted that the TEAM Act would empower them to make these improvements. Id. at
E-2 to E-3. IBM is also a member of the TEAM Coalition, an organization which
represents more than 250 businesses that strongly support the TEAM Act. Id. at E-1,
E-7.
174. Id. at E-5 (testimony of Jonathan P. Hiatt, General Counsel, AFL-CIO). Mr.
Hiatt stated that "employee involvement is most effective, and most durable, when it
is nurtured through collective bargaining, where workers speak with an independent
voice." Id.
175. Id.
176. The TEAM Act in no way prohibits employees' freedom to exercise their Sec-
tion 7 rights and seek union representation. See H.R. 634; S. 295.
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C. The TEAM Act Means Facilitated Communication for Employers
and Employees
Currently, the law involving employee participation programs signif-
icantly inhibits employees from effectively communicating with manage-
ment."7 Implementation of the TEAM Act would undoubtedly dissipate
the adverse impact of Electromation on employers' efforts to implement
employee participation programs." In Electromation and cases follow-
ing that decision, the existence of a labor organization basically turned
on whether the employees engaged in a pattern or practice of making
proposals to management that management could then accept or reject,
and a finding of employer domination turned on whether the employer
organized and determined the nature, structure, and function of the em-
ployee group."m The TEAM Act explicitly removes those considerations
from the analysis of the lawfulness of employee participation groups that
address issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, safety, and health."'
A problem arises because two-way communications involving productivi-
ty, efficiency, safety, and health will inevitably cross the line into the "off
limits" topic of terms and conditions of work.'
Opponents of the TEAM Act cite cases in which the NLRB has permit-
ted employee participation as the basis for their argument that employ-
ees can effectively participate under current law. I" Yet, in &tese so-
called "safe haven" cases, the form of permissible communication was
drastically limited. For example, opponents cite E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. as providing a safe haven under which employees can present
ideas to management through suggestion boxes, brainstorming, and infor-
mation-sharing committees.'" Nevertheless, these methods do not ad-
177. See supra Parts III.C-D.
178. See Barriers, supra note 148. Instead, employers will be attempting to imple-
ment programs that they feel are consistent with the TEAM Act and which would
pass any scrutiny under that law.
179. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.LR.B. 163, 173 (1992), eiforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th
Cir. 1994); see Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.LR.B. 161 (1995); E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 311 N.LR.B. 893 (1993); see also supra Parts Il.C-D.
180. H.I 634, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997); see Barriers, supra
note 148.
181. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-4.
182. See id. at E-5 to E-6 ; see also Simmons Indus., Inc., 321 N.LR.B. No. 32
(1996) (upholding informational committees that addressed product quality and effi-
ciency); General Foods Corp., 231 N.LR.B. 1232 (1977) (same). Although employee
participation may be legal under the statutory framework of sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2),
they are not legal under the interpretation of the NLRA, which proponents of the
TEAM Act argue has been improperly interpreted. 141 CONG. REC. (daily ed. Sept. 27,
1995) (remarks of Rep. Goodling); see infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text
(discussing guidelines for employers in the event the TEAM Act is not enacted).
183. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-4; supra notes 101-09 and accompa-
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dress the heart of this issue-cooperation. Suggestion boxes preclude
group meetings, and brainstorming and information-sharing sessions on
issues such as productivity and efficiency will inevitably deviate into
discussions of prohibited subjects because the productivity and efficien-
cy of an operation depends on people-and the way people work de-
pends on the structure of their jobs."u Thus, it would be impossible for
employees to fully address issues involving efficiency and productivity
without crossing over the line into the area of terms and conditions of
work because increasing productivity may require changing the way the
work is done."
Opponents of the Act also cite the relatively low number of unlawful
domination cases before the NLRB as proof of their contention that the
participation programs which the TEAM Act purports to make lawful are
already lawful." The NLRB process is complaint-driven, however, and
there is little incentive for employees to challenge workplace structures
which meet their interest in having a greater involvement in the
workplace.'87 Further, the Electromation decision has had a chilling ef-
fect on legitimate employee involvement programs and employers' plans
to expand such programs, thereby reducing the number of potential com-
plaints.18
nying text (discussing the E.L du Pont decision).
184. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-4.
185. Id. In Stoody Co., 320 N.LR.B. 18, 19-20 (1995), the NLRB found that an em-
ployer who disbanded a handbook committee after one meeting did not engage in an
unfair labor practice. The employer disbanded the meeting because at the first meet-
ing the employees and a manager discussed the company's vacation notification pol-
icy, a term and condition of work. Id. at 19. The Board found that the meeting was
an "isolated" instance and therefore fell outside of the definition of 'dealing with"
management. Id. at 20. Nevertheless, as former Board Member Charles 1. Cohen not-
ed, "IN]o employer wants to set up a committee and then disband it every time a
'condition of work' is raised. ... That kind of sterile, start-stop arrangement is whol-
ly ineffective." Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-5. Mr. Cohen endorsed the
TEAM Act as a "meaningful safe haven" that will permit companies to seek effective
employee cooperation and ultimately increase their competitive advantages. Id. at E-5
(emphasis added).
186. 141 CONG. REC. H9527 (daily ed Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Martinez).
187. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 13 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
188. Id.; see Dinnen, supra note 85, at E8.
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D. The TEAM Act Retains Protection of Employee Rights
The authors of the Act recognized that an abusive employer may use
the TEAM Act to compromise employees' section 7 rights and therefore
devised language excepting from the permissible groups those that "have,
claim or seek authority" to act as the employees' bargaining representa-
tive or desire to amend or negotiate collective bargaining agreements."W
Through this language, the Act protects the existing rights of employees
to seek formal union representation at any time."° Further, the Act
does not apply to unionized workplaces. 9' Professor Charles Morris
stated that the effect of the TEAM Act could, in some situations, allow
workers to use the TEAM Act to their advantage, indicating that the
TEAM Act "is really a bill of rights for employees.""9 Despite the
protections in the Act, opponents insist that implementation of the
TEAM Act will undermine employee protections by allowing employers
to establish sham unions, thereby creating the illusion of employee pro-
tection, and by allowing employees to implement company unions while
other employees are seeking outside union representation."9 This per-
ceived failure of the Act to explicitly protect against such occurrences
poses a threat to its passage."9
E. The TEAM Act Will Not Result in the Return of Sham Unions
Perhaps the most insulting aspect of the TEAM Act opponents' argu-
ment that the TEAM Act will bring back sham unions is their failure to
acknowledge that the sophistication and education levels of the employ-
189. See H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997); 141 CONG. REC.
H9516 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waldholtz); see supra notes 147
and 170 and accompanying text (discussing the trend toward greater employee in-
volvement in workplace decision making).
190. See 141 CONG. REC. H9531, H9537-38 (daily ed. Sept 27, 1995) (statements of
Reps. Goodling, Sawyer, Sanders, and Gunderson).
191. See supra notes 146 and 159 and accompanying text.
192. Louis C. LaBrecque, Team Act Legislation Could Rebound in Labor's Favor,
Panelist Says, 15 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), No. 15, at A-2 to A-4 (Jan. 24, 1996) (quot-
ing Charles J. Morris, Professor of Labor Law, Southern Methodist University Law
School).
193. 141 CONG. REC. H9523, H9526 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statements of Reps.
Goodling, Gunderson, Miller, Knollenberg, Clay, and Owens).
194. See 141 CONG. Rac. H9526 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Owens); This Team Is a Loser, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 1995, at 6B, avail-
able in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 3347 220; Reich Reaches Out, supra note 149, at A-2.
The defeat of the TEAM Act of 1995 arose from the fear that the relaxation of
§ 8(a)(2) would lead to the resurgence of the company uion. See id. However, this
argument ignores the fact that employees today are significantly more sophisticated
and educated than those in the 1930s. See Flynn, supra note 149, at 66.
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ees of the 1990s are significantly greater than their counterparts of the
1930s." Six decades later, employees now know, they have rights and
they know how to exercise them. Further, with the proliferation of the
mass media over the last six decades, there is no longer the sense that
employers can get away with egregious conduct. Clearly these external
checks on an employer's conduct will remain intact should the TEAM
Act become law.
F. The TEAM Act Will Permit American Companies to Effectively
Compete in the Global Economy
Although involving employees in employment decisions that affect
their life is a crucial benefit of the TEAM Act, this benefit in turn will
create an advantage for American companies seeking to establish a
strong position in increasingly competitive markets. Indeed, the key to
global success in the future will be productivity and efficiency. I" To
the extent that employees are involved in making important decisions,
they will continue to help their companies achieve success.
Major companies that now use employee participation programs laud
the benefits these programs bring not only to the workforce within the
company, but to the company as a whole. 97 In a recent statement to
the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, J. Thomas
Bouchard, Senior Vice President of Human Resources at IBM, described
the company's success with teamwork and stressed the fact that IBM
would like to implement and expand its employee participation pro-
grams." Employees know what they need to make their lives better. If
they can be involved with making those changes, then the work environ-
ment will be enhanced, and, as a result, productivity and efficiency will
be increased."9 This is just one example illustrating why senior man-
agement of major companies, recognizing the significant advantages of a
highly skilled and motivated workforce that comes with employee partici-
pation, strongly support initiatives which remove legal barriers to par-
ticipation programs.2'0
195. See Flynn, supra note 149, at 66.
196. See O'Connor, supra note 3, at 901.
197. See Selected Testimony, supra note 1, at E-1 to E-2.
198. Id. Mr. Bouchard noted the restrictions that current law places on the ability
of teams at IBM to maximize their potential in terms of malng IBM a better place
to work. Id.
199. See id
200. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 9 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823. "Employee
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G. Life Without the TEAM Act-"A Legal Never-Never Land"'
Without the TEAM Act, employers would be left to rely on the frag-
mented guidance offered by established case law interpreting sections
2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.2° Employers would be required to model
their employee participation programs after the limited types of pro-
grams that have withstood scrutiny under sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)."ai
As discussed throughout this Comment, that would not be an easy task.
Employee participation programs would have to be narrowly constructed
and would never realize their full potential.
Based upon the existing interpretations, however, there are several
precautionary measures that an employer may implement to ensure that
its employee participation program will withstand challenge.' First,
employers that create employee participation programs should make it
clear to employees that they are not required to participate. 5 Second,
to the extent managers participate in a program, they should not consti-
tute a majority of the members of the program.2" Third, management
should establish open enrollment for employee participation rather than
selecting the employees."7 Fourth, the employees must not act as a rep-
resentative of other employees and must not engage in any discussions
involving mandatory bargaining subjects.2" In addition, the employer
should make it clear to the employees that their right to organize and
bargain collectively is in no way impeded by the employee participation
program.'s Employers may also avoid challenge by creating specific ad
hoc groups that relate to a particular production, efficiency, or quality
issue and then disbanding them.2"0
involvement is and must be a win-win strategy in all segments of our industrial poli-
cy." Id. (citing testimony of Howard V. Knicely, Executive Vice President, TRW Vehi-
cle Safety Systems, before the Committee on Economic and Educational Opportunities
Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations).
201. H.R. REP. No. 104-248, at 13 (1995), available in 1995 WL 560823.
202. See supra Parts III.C-D. (discussing Electromation and subsequent cases).
203. See supra Part Ell.
204. Steven H. Winterbauer, When Things Aren't What They Seem: Labor Issues in
the Nonunion Workplace, 20 EMPLOYEE REL U. 189 (1994).
205. Id. at 214.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. Mandatory bargaining subjects include grievances, wages, hours, and condi-
tions of work. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Stoody Co., 320 N.LRB. 18, 19-21 (1995). Employers may also try holding
sporadic meetings and using staff meetings to discuss issues. See id. As noted by
former NLRB member Charles I. Cohen, however, any program using the "start-stop"
method of employee involvement would be inadequate. Selected Testimony, supra
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V. CONCLUSION
Employee participation programs are and will continue to be an effec-
tive way for companies to improve productivity, efficiency, and quality of
their products, which will in turn help them compete in the global mar-
ketplace. Although certain characteristics of these programs currently
render many of them unlawful under the National Labor Relations
Act,211 employers should continue to implement programs that are con-
sistent with the purpose of the NLRA-the protection of employees'
rights.212
Opponents of the TEAM Act should consider the people they claim to
protect. Many of these workers desire a voice on the job, and many have
successfully been heard by way of employee participation programs
throughout the country. Although these programs do exist, their full
potential is overshadowed by archaic laws that fail to recognize the re-
ality of the new workplace.
The passage of the former TEAM Act by Congress signified the recog-
nition that employee-employer relations have shifted from adversarial to
cooperative. Under this Act, employers will be able to involve employees
in many important facets of the company, without the fear of facing
unfair labor practice charges, provided that they do not violate the spe-
cific protections in the Act. The time has come for employee empower-
ment and involvement in important aspects of production that will allow
American companies to become a stronger, more competitive force in
the global marketplace. The passage of the TEAM Act will be a crucial
step in reaching that goal.
MICHELE L. MARYoIT
note 1, at E-4.
211. See supra Part III (discussing case law prohibiting use of employee participa-
tion programs).
212. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1994).
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